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1. INTRODUCTION: WHERE TORT LAW AND CONTRACT LAW INTERSECT
A. Background
The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") was enacted in 1948 and
partially waives the sovereign immunity of the United States by provid-
ing United States District Courts with subject matter jurisdiction over
tort claims brought against the United States.' The FTCA states in part,
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ...
* I thank my parents, my brother, and Alexandra, whose love and support I cannot live
without. I also thank my family and friends, as well as Professor Marc Fajer for advising me. I
appreciate all of you very much. Gregory Boulos, J.D. Candidate, University of Miami School of
Law, Class of 2012.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2011).
1159
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.2
On the other hand, the Tucker Act partially waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States by providing the United States Court of
Federal Claims ("Court of Claims") with subject matter jurisdiction over
claims based on a contract.' The Tucker Act states in part,
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent
with the Court of Claims, of:
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department,
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.4
The District Court and the Court of Claims have concurrent jurisdiction
over the claims described in (a)(2) if the amount in dispute does not
exceed $10,000.1 However, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over such claims when the amount in dispute exceeds $10,000.6
This article addresses tort claims in which a plaintiff alleges the
United States breached a duty established in a government contract.
Although such cases ostensibly should be litigated under the FTCA and
in the District Court, such claims have been handled differently depend-
ing on the Circuit in which they arise.' At times, such claims are treated
as breach of contract claims for jurisdictional purposes.9 Such treatment
is supported by two considerations. First, a long standing policy exists
which calls for government contracts to be interpreted by federal law,
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2011).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2011).
4. Id.
5. Aleutco Corp. v. United States, 244 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1957) (explaining that "the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the district courts now limited to claims not in
excess of $10,000, while the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of all claims in contract in
excess of that amount.") (emphasis added).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1963); Blanchard v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1965); Salter v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 1524
(M.D. Ala. 1995); Downs v. United States, No. 06-20861-CIV, 2011 WL 2416049 (S.D. Fla.
2011); Martin v. United States, 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
8. The District Court and the Court of Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over tort claims
based on the breach of a contractual duty where the amount in dispute is $10,000 or less.
However, this point addresses those claims that exceed $10,000.
9. See, e.g., Woodbury, 313 F.2d 291.
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rather than state law."o Second, cases litigated under the FTCA are sub-
ject to state law." Thus, where a tort arises from the breach of a duty
established in a government contract, some Courts will hold that the
District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 2 That way, state law
will not be used to interpret or apply a government contract (as required
by the FTCA).13
This article advocates the position that any tort claim brought
against the United States grounded on the breach of a duty established in
a government contract should be treated as a breach of contract claim for
jurisdictional purposes. Thus, such claims should be litigated in the
Court of Claims rather than the District Court.
In 1963, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Woodbury v. United
States.'" The Court held that tort claims brought against the United
States that are based on the breach of a duty established in a government
contract are in substance breach of contract claims for purposes of estab-
lishing jurisdiction.'I In other words, where a plaintiff sues the United
States in tort and the alleged breached duty was established in a govern-
ment contract, the claim is to be litigated in the Court of Claims rather
than the District Court. The Court never indicated that the type of injury
(i.e., physical or pecuniary) was relevant in determining jurisdiction. 16
The Woodbury decision was followed by other Circuits, including the
Third and former Fifth Circuit."
Eighteen years after the Woodbury decision, the Ninth Circuit
decided Martin v. United States.' In that case, the Ninth Circuit held
that the rule in Woodbury only applies where the harm caused by the
breach of a contractual duty results in purely economic harm." The
Martin Court essentially limited the application of the rule in Woodbury
10. Id. at 295. Government contracts are subject to federal contract law. Tort claims under the
FTCA are subject to state law. Thus, litigating such claims under the FTCA would involve
applying state law to government contracts and will result in multifarious decisions and standards
of interpretation.
11. See Id. (explaining that "[tihe [FTCA] expressly provides for liability of the United States
for torts 'under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.'") (citation
omitted). Under this Act, therefore, state law, not federal law, controls.)
12. Id. at 295.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 296.
16. See generally Woodbury, 313 F.2d 291.
17. See Petersburg Borough v. United States, 839 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1988); see also United
States v. Smith, 324 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1963).
18. 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
19. Id. at 706.
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to cases where purely economic harm results. 2 0 As the dissent aptly
points out, the decision was inconsistent and not in line with
Woodbury.2 1
The former Fifth Circuit followed the Woodbury decision in
Blanchard.2 2 However, the Eleventh Circuit has not yet expressly
decided whether to adopt the limitation contained in the Martin decision.
This article advocates a rejection of Martin by the Eleventh Circuit
because it is not in line with the purpose behind the rule in Woodbury
and because Martin is an inconsistent opinion.2 ' The dissent in Martin is
particularly persuasive.24 The Eleventh Circuit may soon have an oppor-
tunity to explicitly reject the reasoning in Martin and apply Woodbury
even where physical injury results from the United States breaching a
duty established in a government contract.
Recently, Downs v. United States was remanded by the Eleventh
Circuit and has been litigated in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida.2 5 This case, if appealed, will present an
opportunity for the Eleventh Circuit to clarify its position regarding tort
claims brought against the United States that are grounded on the breach
of a duty established in a government contract. 2 6 Downs will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in section VI of this article.
B. Format of this article
The first section of this article will analyze the decision in Wood-
bury. The opinion succinctly discussed the underlying reasons why tort
claims based on the breach of a government contract should be treated
differently, jurisdictionally, from other tort claims. Specifically, such
claims should fall under the Tucker Act's jurisdiction and should be
litigated in the Court of Claims. 27 This would ensure the uniform inter-
20. Id.
21. Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (stating, "First, [the majority] distinguishes Woodbury by
pointing out that the plaintiff there suffered only economic harm, while in the instant case, the
plaintiff has suffered a physical injury. Nothing in Woodbury suggests such a distinction.")
22. Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1965). Although the
former Fifth Circuit addressed Woodbury in two other cases prior to deciding Blanchard,
Blanchard is the first former Fifth Circuit case to address the Woodbury opinion in great detail.
See Smith, 324 F.2d 622; see also Herder Truck Lines v. United States, 335 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.
1964).
23. Martin, 649 F.2d at 726.
24. Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
25. No. 06-20861-CIV, 2011 WL 2416049 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
26. It is important to note that this article does not assert that the Federal Government can
never be sued under the FTCA for personal injuries. It is only when the breached duty is
established in a government contract. If the breached duty is established by statute or the
circumstances surrounding the injury, the District Court has jurisdiction.
27. Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1963).
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pretation of government contracts.28 Furthermore, an understanding of
these underlying justifications evinces the reasons why the subsequent
Martin decision was inconsistent with Woodbury.
After discussing the nuances of the Woodbury decision, this article
will discuss the majority opinion in Martin. This decision essentially
limited the holding in Woodbury. It held that the FTCA applies to tort
claims based on the breach of a duty established in a government con-
tract where the breach results in personal injury, as opposed to pecuniary
harm.2 9 The Court also asserted that District Courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over any "classic tort" under the FTCA.30 This article will
also discuss criticisms of the Martin decision.
This article will then focus on the Eleventh Circuit's position on
this issue. The longest standing precedent on the issue can be found in
the former Fifth Circuit's opinion in Blanchard.3 1 In that case, the for-
mer Fifth Circuit adopted the rule in Woodbury and held that tort claims
based on the breach of a contractual duty fall under the Tucker Act's
jurisdiction.32 Thus, such cases are to be litigated in the Court of
Claims. A discussion of why the Eleventh Circuit should not adopt the
reasoning and holding of Martin will follow.
Lastly, this article will discuss an opportunity for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit to reject Martin by applying the reasoning of Woodbury and
Blanchard to a case that has been decided by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. That case is Downs v. United
States.34
II. WOODBURY V. UNITED STATES: WHEN IS A TORT CLAIM BROUGHT
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN SUBSTANCE A BREACH OF
CONTRACT CLAIM FOR JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES?
Several Courts have addressed facts in which the United States
allegedly breached a duty that was embodied in a government contract,
resulting in harm to a plaintiff." Courts finding that such tort claims are
28. Id. at 296-97.
29. Martin, 649 F.2d 701.
30. Id.
31. It is important to note that two other former Fifth Circuit opinions favorably quoted
Woodbury. Those cases will be discussed in this article. United States v. Smith, 324 F.2d 622 (5th
Cir. 1963); Herder Truck Lines v. United States, 335 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1964). However,
Blanchard was the first former Fifth Circuit opinion to analyze Woodbury in great detail.
32. Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1965).
33. Id.
34. Downs v. United States, No. 06-20861-CIV, 2011 WL 2416049 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
35. See, e.g., Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1963); Blanchard, 341 F.2d
at 351; Salter v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Downs, 2011 WL 2416049,
at *1; Martin, 649 F.2d 701.
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in substance breach of contract claims for jurisdictional purposes typi-
cally cite to Woodbury v. United States in support of that finding.36
Woodbury was decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1963.
In Woodbury, the plaintiff brought an action against the United
States asserting that the Housing and Home Finance Agency ("HHFA")
committed a breach of fiduciary duty while he was in the process of
constructing prefabricated housing for naval and civilian personnel sta-
tioned in the Kodiak Naval Base in Alaska." The plaintiff brought his
action under the FTCA, alleged over $800,000 in damages, and the case
was litigated in the United States District Court."
The case was eventually appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In its opin-
ion, the Ninth Circuit held that tort claims that are based entirely upon
the breach of duty established in a government contract are in substance
breach of contract claims for jurisdictional purposes.39 In other words,
the Court held that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the FTCA. The case was subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction and
should have been brought in the Court of Claims.4 0
Had this claim been brought against an individual, the question of
jurisdiction would not be an issue. Generally, a plaintiff may base a
negligence claim on the breach of a contractual duty in the District
Court.4 1 However, where the defendant is the United States, jurisdiction
becomes an issue due to the unique nature of government contracts. Spe-
cifically, the Court in Woodbury explained that a "long established pol-
icy" existed by which "government contracts are to be given a uniform
interpretation and application under federal law, rather than being given
different interpretations and applications depending upon the vagaries of
the laws of fifty different states."42 This presents a problem because the
law applied under the FTCA and the law applied under the Tucker Act
differs.4 3 The Court noted that actions brought under the FTCA are gov-
erned by state law.
The Federal Tort Claims Act expressly provides for liability of the
United States for torts "under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
36. See, e.g., Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1963); Blanchard, 341 F.2d
351; Salter v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Downs, 2011 WL 2416049, at
*1; Martin, 649 F.2d at 701.
37. Woodbury, 313 F.2d at 291-92.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 295-96.
40. See id. at 296 (stating that where the cause of action is essentially for breach of contract,
the Tucker Act does apply, even though the breach could also be said to be tortious).
41. See, e.g., Gallicho v. Corporate Grp, Servs., Inc., 227 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
42. Woodbury, 313 F.2d at 295 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 295.
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the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." (28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)). Under this Act, therefore, state law, not federal law, con-
trols. Thus to permit the result here sought would give to the plaintiff
not only a choice of forum (district court rather than Court of Claims
where over $10,000 is sought), but also a choice of law."
From these statements, it is clear that the underlying purpose of
finding some tort claims in substance breach of contract claims for juris-
dictional purposes was to ensure that federal law is utilized in the inter-
pretation of government contracts."5 Nowhere in the opinion does the
Court point to the nature of plaintiff's injury (physical or pecuniary) as a
basis for its decision." Nonetheless, the Court in Martin v. United States
determined that jurisdiction turns on the nature of the plaintiffs injury.47
III. MARTIN V. UNITED STATES: THE NINTH CIRCUIT LIMITS
WOODBURY TO ACTIONS IN WHICH PECUNIARY
HARM IS ALLEGED.
In Martin, the plaintiff, Mildred Martin, brought a personal injury
claim against the United States.48 The plaintiff purchased a home that
had been repossessed by the Veteran's Administration ("VA").4 9 Prior to
the sale, an inspector recommended that certain repairs be made.o The
VA agreed to the repairs but required that the plaintiff move into the
home prior to the repairs being complete."' While occupying the home,
the plaintiff fell in the bathtub and injured her hand.5 2 The plaintiff
brought a claim for tortious breach of a contractual duty, alleging that
the VA had a contractual obligation to repair the premises and make
them habitable. 3 The plaintiff sought damages in excess of $10,000.11
The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiff."
The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The key issue was
whether the District Court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction under
the FTCA over a case grounded on the tortious breach of a contractual
duty.56 The government, relying on Woodbury, argued that the District
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally id. at 291.
47. 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
48. Id. at 702.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 702-03.
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Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the breached duty was
established in a government contract.57 Thus, the government argued
that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over the claim rather than the
District Court."
The Court made two assertions while holding that the District
Court properly exercised jurisdiction under the FTCA. First, the Court
asserted that the rule in Woodbury did not apply to the Martin facts
because the plaintiff here is complaining of personal injuries as opposed
to the purely pecuniary harm that was complained of in Woodbury."
Second, the Court asserted that every "classic tort" is within the jurisdic-
tion of the District Court. 60
While discussing Woodbury, the Court explained that the plaintiff
in that case complained of severe economic harm.6 1 It further pointed
out that every other case that the government cited was contractual in
nature.62 The Court found that the Martin facts were more analogous to
Aleutco Corp. v. United States.63 Relying on Aleutco, the Court
explained, "[M]erely because one element of the case is based on a con-
tractual relationship would not further the statutory distinction made
between those cases to be brought in the Court of Claims and those to be
brought in the District Court."64
Furthermore, the Court pointed to Aleutco as an example of a "clas-
sic tort" that was within the jurisdiction of the District Court despite
involving a government contract. 5 The plaintiff in Aleutco brought an
action for conversion against the United States. 6 6 Essentially, the plain-
tiff had entered into a contract to purchase surplus war property located
in Alaska from the United States.67 After paying for those goods, the
United States sold those goods to another buyer.68 As a result, the plain-
tiff brought an action for conversion. 69 The Court found that the action
was subject to the District Court's jurisdiction under the FTCA. As will
be discussed later in this article, the Martin Court's reliance on Aleutco
was unfounded.70
57. Id. at 704-05.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 704.
60. Id. at 705.
61. Id. at 704.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 705.
65. Id. at 704-05.
66. Id. at 704.
67. Aleutco Corp. v. United States, 244 F.2d 674, 675 (3d Cir. 1957).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 675-76.
70. See Martin v. United States, 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
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IV. CRITICISM OF MARTIN
There are several reasons why the Martin decision should not be
followed by other Circuits. First, the Court's opinion is contrary to the
underlying justifications for treating tort claims as in substance breach of
contract claims for jurisdictional purposes. Second, the Martin Court
ignored language in the Woodbury opinion that called for a contrary
holding in Martin. Third, the Martin Court's reliance on Aleutco is
unfounded because the contract was not the essential basis of the plain-
tiff's claim in that case. Lastly, the majority opinion in Martin is, in part,
inconsistent.
A. Martin is contrary to longstanding policy
It seems that the majority drew its conclusions from the fact that the
plaintiff in Woodbury brought an action for breach of fiduciary duty,
which is a tort that only results in pecuniary harm." However, the
majority failed to realize that this fact had no effect on the Woodbury
Court's opinion. Rather, the underlying policy upon which the Wood-
bury Court formed its holding was that government contracts should be
governed by federal law, not state law.72 As previously mentioned, the
law that is applied under the FTCA is state law.73 Thus, no tort claim
based on the breach of a duty established in a government contract,
regardless of the nature of the resulting harm, should be litigated under
the FTCA.
B. Language in Woodbury ignored by the Martin Court
To further illustrate the Martin Court's misunderstanding of Wood-
bury, it should be noted that Woodbury explicitly recognized the Court
of Claims's jurisdiction over a case in which a plaintiff complained of
physical harm resulting from the breach of a government contract.
Somewhat analogous is the holding in Feres v. United States that
military personnel sustaining injuries while on active duty, injuries
resulting from the negligence of other members of the Armed Forces,
cannot recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act. There is no
express exception for such cases in that Act, but the Court denied
recovery because the relationship of military personnel to the Gov-
ernment has been governed exclusively by federal law.74
Through this example, the Woodbury Court expressly articulates
that a personal injury case may not be subject to FTCA jurisdiction if the
71. Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1963).
72. Id. at 295-96.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is governed exclusively
by federal law." Because government contracts are governed by federal
law, it follows that any tort claim based on the breach of a government
contract must not be litigated under the FTCA. Considering the example
of Feres, it is hard to see why the Martin Court attempted to analogize
the facts to Aleutco. Feres provides a much more analogous fact pattern.
Both Feres and Martin involved a personal injury and the duty that was
breached was embodied in a government contract. It seems that the Mar-
tin Court was reaching when it decided to analogize a personal injury
claim to the conversion claim in Aleutco.
C. Reliance on Aleutco is unfounded
As stated above, the Martin Court relied on Aleutco in asserting
that "merely because one element of the case is based on a contractual
relationship would not further the statutory distinction made between
those cases to be brought in the Court of Claims and those to be brought
in the District Court."
However, the Martin Court ignored the language in Woodbury that
explicitly discussed Aleutco. The Woodbury Court stated,
[T]he contract [in Aleutco] was not the essential basis of the claim
rather, it came into the case as a claimed defense on behalf of the
government, which asserted that plaintiff, by breach of contractual
arrangements with the government, had forfeited its right to the
property. 7
Thus, it could be argued, and was asserted by the Woodbury Court,
that Aleutco was properly under the District Court's jurisdiction because
the basis of the claim was not the breach of a duty established in a
government contract. The Martin Court ignored this detail in relying on
Aleutco.
D. Unreasonable reasoning
The Martin Court advanced the position that plaintiffs bringing an
action sounding in tort, in which a breach of contract was merely a back-
ground to the tort, should bring their claims to the District Court.7 ' This
seems to draw a distinction between tort claims involving contracts
where the contract is merely a background to the tort, and other tort
actions where the contract is something more than just background. This
distinction does not seem to make much sense. Any time a negligence
75. Id.
76. Martin v. United States, 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
77. Id. at 706.
78. Id. at 705.
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claim involves the breach of a contractual duty, the contract will likely
merely be a background for the tort.7 9 There are four elements to be
satisfied in a negligence claim."o Those elements are (1) an existing
duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) a causal relationship between the
duty and (4) harm suffered by the plaintiff."' When the duty is estab-
lished in a contract, the contract only involves one element of the negli-
gence claim. It appears that, in such cases, the contract will be merely a
background for the tort.
Furthermore, although the Court in Martin seemed to believe that it
applied Woodbury accurately, it essentially limited Woodbury. The
underlying basis for the Court's decision includes two theories. First, it
appears that the Court recognized that tort claims based on a duty estab-
lished by a government contract resulting in economic harm should be
litigated in the Court of Claims.8 2 However, the Court also seems to hold
that a "classic tort" should be subject to FTCA jurisdiction." These two
statements can be inconsistent under certain circumstances. What about
those classic torts that result in pecuniary harm? Are there no negligence
actions that involve pecuniary, rather than physical, harm to the
plaintiff?
V. THE STATE OF ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT
The Eleventh Circuit has consistently recognized the rule expressed
in Woodbury. First, this section will discuss Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance Company. Second, this section will discuss two
former Fifth Circuit cases that favorably quote Woodbury. Lastly, this
section will discuss a Middle District of Alabama opinion that adopted
the limitation in Martin.
A. Blanchard
The first Eleventh Circuit case in which a tort claim brought under
the FTCA was found to be in substance a breach of contract claim for
jurisdictional purposes was decided by the former Fifth Circuit." In
Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, the former
Fifth Circuit relied on Woodbury in holding that the District Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over torts grounded on the breach of a duty
79. See, e.g., Galichio v. Corporate Grp. Serys., 227 So.2d 591 (3d DCA Fla. 1969).
80. See, e.g., Mintz v. Blue Cross of Cal., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1594 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
81. Id. at 1609.
82. See generally, Martin, 649 F.2d 701.
83. Id. at 705.
84. As noted above, there are two other former Fifth Circuit opinions that favorably quote
Woodburv. See United States v. Smith, 324 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1963); Herder Truck Lines v.
United States, 335 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1964). Those cases will be discussed shortly.
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established in a government contract.15
Although Blanchard was decided fifteen years prior to Martin, an
analysis of the Court's underlying reasoning in Blanchard reveals that
the former Fifth Circuit's opinion based its decision not on the nature of
the alleged harm, but on the source of the breached duty.8 6 Thus, follow-
ing Blanchard would require rejecting the reasoning and holding
advanced by the Martin opinion.
In Blanchard, the Court explicitly recognized that cases litigated
under the Tucker Act were governed by federal law, whereas cases liti-
gated under the FTCA were governed by state law." The Court further
recognized the long standing policy that "the law to be applied in con-
struing or applying provisions of government contracts is federal, not
state law."" Accordingly, the reason that tort claims based on the breach
of a duty established in a government contract are litigated in the Court
of Claims is because of the source of the duty (i.e., the government con-
tract); it has nothing to do with the nature of the harm suffered by the
plaintiff.
In support of its conclusion that the claim in Blanchard fell outside
of the scope of the FTCA, the Court found that (1) the sole relationship
between the plaintiff and the United States was wholly contractual and
(2) the plaintiff's claims related exclusively to the manner in which gov-
ernment officials performed their responsibilities under the contract.89
The Court concluded that a lack of jurisdiction under the FTCA is a
consequence of such findings. 90 These findings make no reference to the
nature of harm suffered by a plaintiff."
The Eleventh Circuit, through Blanchard and the two cases that are
explained shortly, has consistently held that tort claims based on the
breach of a duty established in a government contract are in substance
breach of contract claims for jurisdictional purposes.9 2 However, these
cases have mostly involved a plaintiff who alleges purely pecuniary
harm resulted." It is not certain how the Eleventh Circuit would resolve
such a case in which physical harm results.
The two former Fifth Circuit opinions published before Blanchard
85. 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1965).
86. Id. at 358.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 359.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.; United States v. Smith, 324 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1963); Herder Truck Lines v. United
States, 335 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1964).
93. I have not found an Eleventh Circuit case on this issue involving a plaintiff that alleges
physical harm as opposed to purely pecuniary harm.
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shed some, but not much, light on the Circuit's position on the issue. It
should also be noted that one District Court within the Eleventh Circuit,
the Middle District of Alabama, has expressly adopted the reasoning in
Martin.
B. Smith and Herder Truck
As mentioned above, Blanchard was the first former Fifth Circuit
case to address Woodbury in great detail. However, prior to deciding
Blanchard, Woodbury was briefly mentioned in two other former Fifth
Circuit cases.
The first case that mentioned Woodbury was Smith." In that case,
the Court delved into the minds of the legislators who drafted the FTCA
and explained the legislative intent behind the act.95 As part of that
explanation, the Court stated,
The concern of Congress, as illustrated by the legislative history, was
the problem of a person injured by an employee operating a Govern-
ment vehicle or otherwise acting within the scope of his
employment."
This legislative intent illustrates that the FTCA should not apply where a
duty is established through a government contract. The language cited to
above helps distinguish those tortious acts that come under the ambit of
the FTCA and those that do not. Specifically, the language suggests that
the FTCA applies where a government employee breaches a general
duty of care. That is, a duty of care that arises out of the circumstances
of a particular case. For example, an employee has a duty to operate a
vehicle with due care. This duty will not be found in a government con-
tract. Rather, it is a duty that arises out of the undertaking of an inher-
ently dangerous task. Such duties are distinguishable from duties that
arise solely because they are established through contract. Smith sug-
gests that duties established by a contract were not contemplated by the
drafters of the FTCA.
The other former Fifth Circuit case that mentioned Woodbury is
Herder Truck Lines v. United States." In that case, the former Fifth
Circuit quoted Woodbury with approval." The following portion of the
Woodbury opinion that was cited with approval is significant to this
discussion:
The notion of such waiver of breach and suit in tort is a product of
94. 324 F.2d 622.
95. Id. at 625.
96. Id. at 622.
97. 335 F.2d 261.
98. Id. at 263.
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the history of English forms of action; it should not defeat the long
established policy that government contracts are to be given a uni-
form interpretation and application under federal law, rather than
being given different interpretations and applications depending upon
the vagaries of the laws of the fifty different states. 99
The fact that this particular language was quoted with approval indicates
that the Court was more concerned with the source of the duty rather
than the nature of the alleged harm to the plaintiff. Specifically, this
language shows that the Court is concerned with the interpretation of
government contracts. ' 0 The nature of the harm to the plaintiff is irrele-
vant in interpreting a duty established in a contract.
C. The Middle District of Alabama
In Salter v. United States, the Middle District of Alabama expressly
adopted the views in Martin."'o Being the only decision in the Eleventh
Circuit to do so, Salter is an important decision that should be analyzed
carefully. Overall, there is nothing in the opinion that controverts the
points made in this article, nor does the opinion provide an adequate
basis for adopting the Martin Court's limitation on Woodbury.
The plaintiff in Salter was an employee of the Southern Boil Wee-
vil Eradication Program ("the Program").' 02 The Program was a cooper-
ative effort by the federal government, several state governments, and
cotton producers to eradicate the boil weevil, which is a cotton destroy-
ing pest.10 3 The plaintiff, Charles G. Salter, alleged that, while working
in cotton fields for the Program, he was exposed to excessive amounts of
pesticides.104 As a result of this over-exposure, the plaintiff alleged that
he suffered numerous injuries.'os Those injuries included mental, emo-
tional, and physical injuries.10 6 Salter brought an action for negligence
against the United States under the FTCA.107 The Middle District of
Alabama found that it had jurisdiction over the claim.'0
In its reasoning, the Court accurately quoted Woodbury and
approved of the distinction between tort and contract claims.' 09 How-
ever, after quoting no language that would support the notion that one
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 880 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ala 1995).
102. Id. at 1527.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1532.
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must be a party to a contract for Woodbury to apply, the Middle District
stated that "Salter is not attempting to recover in tort for the breach of a
contract to which he was a party.""'o Similarly, without pointing to any
language in Woodbury that the nature of the alleged harm is relevant, the
Court points out that Salter suffered physical, rather than pecuniary,
harm."' As one reads the rest of the opinion, it is clear that the Court is
relying on Martin while explaining that the FTCA applies." 2 Thus, for
the same reasons expressed above advocating the rejection of Martin,
the Eleventh Circuit should not rely on Salter in deciding whether or not
to reject the rule in Martin. The two cases embody the same
reasoning. 1"3
Furthermore, there is an additional reason why Salter does not aid
in determining whether Martin should be adopted by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. The duty in Salter was not entirely based in a government con-
tract. 14 Rather, the Court explained that, under Alabama law, a person
must act as a reasonably prudent person when he or she voluntarily
undertakes safety inspections." 5 Accordingly, the Court found that the
duty in Salter also arose independent of a contract because of the gov-
ernment's affirmative duty to undertake an inspection in a reasonably
safe manner. 6 Thus, Salter is distinguishable from the kinds of cases
that this article is referring to. The position in this article only applies to
cases in which the alleged breached duty was established in a govern-
ment contract. Duties arising out of the law or other circumstances are
beyond the scope of this article.
Salter raises another important point. The Court in Salter implicitly
criticized applying the Woodbury standard to cases in which physical
injury resulted because, in the Court's view, there would be no remedy
for the plaintiff under the Tucker Act."' If this is true, it reveals a flaw
in the Tucker Act, not in the reasoning provided in this Article. The
Woodbury Court determined that there was a longstanding policy that
government contracts be interpreted using federal law, and such inter-
110. Id.
111. Id. (stating, "Unlike the plaintiffs who suffered economic injury in the cases upon which
the Defendant relies, Salter suffered personal injury.")
112. See generally id.
113. Compare id. with Martin v. United States, 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
114. Salter, 880 F. Supp. at 1530.
115. Id.
116. Id. (stating that "a plaintiff may argue that another party has duties independent of any
contract because that party has acted affirmatively . . . . [A defendant] can be held liable for
negligence injuring third parties, whether or not the defendant has a similar duty under contract to
some others.") (citing Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496, 502
(Ala. 1984)).
117. Id. at 1532.
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pretation is impossible under the FTCA because state law applies."
Thus, if the Tucker Act does not provide a plaintiff with remedies in
such cases, the legislature ignored the longstanding policy recognized in
Woodbury and should have accommodated plaintiffs who bring such
actions. Such accommodation should have come in the form of fashion-
ing appropriate remedies in such cases.
Nonetheless, the idea that there are no remedies for plaintiffs who
bring tort actions under the Tucker Act, in which the underlying duty
was established in a government contract, is difficult to accept. There
are other cases over which the Court of Claims had jurisdiction where a
plaintiff was complaining of a tort that was found to be essentially a
breach of contract for jurisdictional purposes. Consider Woodbury: the
action, which was a tort action, was sent to the Court of Claims for
disposition. 119 Despite the fact that the action was a tort, and was only
found to be a breach of contract for jurisdictional purposes, there was no
mention of a lack of remedies under the Tucker Act.'20
The Court in Salter did not elaborate on its statement that there are
no alternative remedies under the Tucker Act.12 1 However, it appears
from other opinions, which essentially send tort cases to the Court of
Claims, that a plaintiff would have remedies available if the action were
litigated in the Court of Claims.122
VI. APPLICATION OF WOODBURY TO DowNs
As explained above, the Eleventh Circuit may soon have an oppor-
tunity to explicitly reject Martin. Downs v. United States is a case that
has been litigated in the Southern District of Florida.123 It involves a
plaintiff who severely injured himself after diving into Miami Beach
during the early morning of April 7, 2003.124 The plaintiff alleged, and
the District Court ultimately found, that he struck his head upon a large
rock.125 The story of how the rock arrived on the shores of Miami Beach
starts in the late 1970's, when the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers ("the Corps"), together with Miami-Dade County, signed a Local
Cooperating Agreement ("LCA") in order to renourish Miami Beach.'26
118. Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963).
119. See generally id.
120. Id.
121. Salter, 880 F. Supp. at 1532.
122. See generally, Woodbury, 313 F.2d 291.
123. Downs v. United States, No. 06-20861-CIV, 2011 WL 2416049 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id. at *2.
126. Id.
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The entire project was divided into several phases.12 7 The phase
that is relevant to the Downs case is Phase Two, which involved renour-
ishing the beach between 72nd and 73rd Street. 128 The project involved
dredging fill material from offshore and adding it to several miles of
Miami Beach that was in the process of erosion.129 The LCA outlined
the obligations of the Corps. 3 1 Specifically, the LCA required that the
Corps only use non-rocky, sandy material similar to that of the existing
beach, in the fill that would be used.' 3 ' It was expected that only five
percent of the fill would consist of rocks, and that those rocks would
range in size from two to ten inches in diameter. 3 2 The District Court
found that there were rocks the size of basketballs in the fill."' The
Court further found that Downs struck his head on one of those rocks
when he dove into Miami Beach, resulting in his severe injuries. 34
During the bench trial, the United States argued that the source of
the duty not to include large rocks in the fill was established in the LCA,
which required that the Corps use "non-rocky material."33 This argu-
ment was rather persuasive considering that a substantial period of time
was dedicated to interpreting what the LCA required of the Corps.' 3 6
Particularly, the case had previously been remanded by the Eleventh
Circuit to determine the definition of the term "non-rocky material." 3 1
It was determined that the term meant "a material consisting almost
exclusively of sand, with only a small percentage of interspersed gravel
no larger than one or two inches in diameter." 3 8 It appears that, had it
not been for the LCA, the Corps would not have been required to use the
materials defined in the government contract.
Nonetheless, the District Court found that the LCA was not the
source of the Corps' duty to not include rocks in the fill. 139 Specifically,
it found that the Corps had an obligation to complete the project in a
reasonably safe manner. 4 0 The Eleventh Circuit does not have to disa-
127. Id. at *1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *2.
134. Id. at *5.
135. Id. at *1
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *Il.
140. Id. (stating that "[t]he LCA expresses, at least in part, the Corps' undertaking for the
Project. After entering this undertaking, the Corps became obligated to complete the Project in a
reasonably safe manner.").
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gree with this conclusion, and ultimately does not need to overturn the
District Court's findings, in order to clarify the Circuit's position on
Martin. It need only express that, had the LCA been the only source of
the Corps duty to Downs, the District Court would lack subject matter
jurisdiction under Blanchard "41, Smith 142, and Herder Truck 143 In
doing so, the Eleventh Circuit should reiterate the underlying justifica-
tions for making the distinction between tort actions based on a duty
established in a government contract and other tort actions.
However, it is still possible to accept the District Court's finding
that there was both a general duty to perform the contract in a reasona-
bly safe manner and a duty established in the LCA to not include rocks
in the fill, yet still hold that the claim should be litigated in the Court of
Claims. To accomplish this, language used by the Federal Circuit in
Wood v. United States should be adopted.144
"If contractual relations exist, the fact that the alleged breach is also
tortious does not foreclose Tucker Act jurisdiction." 45 If an action
arises "primarily from a contractual undertaking," jurisdiction lies in
the Claims Court "regardless of the fact that the loss resulted from the
negligent manner in which defendant performed its contract." 4 6
Thus, since the primary thrust of [plaintiffs] complaint is breach of
contract, even if a negligence cause would lie, the Claims Court
would retain jurisdiction over the suit.14 1
This language directly applies to Downs, even if the source of the
Corps' duty derived both from the LCA and a general duty to undertake
the performance of the contract in a reasonably safe manner. 14 Note that
the language quoted above states that in an action arising primarily from
a contractual undertaking (the entire project of renourishing the beach
was a contractual undertaking) the Court of Claims has jurisdiction
regardless of the fact that the loss resulted from the negligent manner in
141. Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1965).
142. United States v. Smith, 324 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1963).
143. Herder Truck Lines v. United States, 335 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1964).
144. It should be noted that the opinion in its entirety did not hold that Woodbury applies to
cases in which physical harm results. However, the quoted language captures the essence of the
position taken in this article, especially considering that the Woodbury Court never mentioned the
nature of the resulting harm as a basis for determining whether the District Court or the Court of
Claims has jurisdiction over an action.
145. Fountain v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 495, 427 F.2d 759, 761 (1970).
146. San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 960 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (quoting H.F. Allen Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
147. Wood v. United States, 961 F.2d 195, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
148. Downs v. United States, No. 06-20861-CIV, 2011 WL 2416049, at *11 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(stating that "[t]he LCA expresses, at least in part, the Corps' undertaking for the Project. After
entering this undertaking, the Corps became obligated to complete the Project in a reasonably safe
manner.").
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which the defendant performed its contract.14 9 In Downs, the District
Court found that the Corps performed its contractual duty in a negligent
manner.' 0 The language of the Federal Circuit can lead to the conclu-
sion that the claim should still be litigated in the Court of Claims
because, even though the Corps performed their duties in a negligent
manner, the tort arose from a contractual undertaking.'
Considering the underlying justifications of the Woodbury decision,
such an approach makes good sense. Regardless of whether the duty was
actually expressed in the contract, or if a duty was breached during the
performance of a contract, it is likely that the contract itself will be sub-
ject to review and interpretation if litigation arises. For example,
whether a worker's action is imputed to the Corps may depend on
whether the worker's actions were conducted in the course of the
worker's employment.' 5 2 In fact, the FTCA specifically uses such lan-
guage.' In turn, determining what exactly was in the worker's course
of employment may depend on what the Corps was obligated to do
under a government contract. If the Corps was obligated to deliver fill
with no rocks, then the actions of a worker who delivers fill with rocks
is imputed to the Corps. However, the actions of a worker who decides
to act in a manner bearing no relation to the Corps' obligation in the
contract may not be imputed to the Corps. Accordingly, using the Fed-
eral Circuits' language can protect the policy advanced in Woodbury in a
broad and effective manner.
VII. WHY SHOULD THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REJECT THE LIMITATION
ESTABLISHED IN MARTIN?
There are several reasons why the Eleventh Circuit should reject
the limitation establish in Martin. First, as discussed above, an analysis
of the underlying reasoning of the Martin decision reveals that the Court
in Martin ignored longstanding policy. The Court essentially created an
opportunity for government contracts to be subject to state law. Further-
more, the decision creates a burden on the United States Government by
subjecting its contracts to the varying contract laws of the fifty states.'
149. Wood, 961 F.2d at 198.
150. Downs, 2011 WL 2416049, at *9.
151. Wood, 961 F.2d at 198.
152. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228; see also Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 7.707.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (stating that "the district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.").
154. Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit should follow the precedent established
by Blanchard.'5 5 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit should uphold the
longstanding policy that government contracts should be subject to fed-
eral law and recognize the importance of the uniform interpretation and
application of government contracts.
A. The limitation established in Martin ignores longstanding policy
and the underlying justifications for the rule enunciated
by the Woodbury Court.
Both Martin and Blanchard purport to build upon the platform cre-
ated by the Ninth Circuit in Woodbury.'5 6 The Courts in both cases jus-
tify their opinions by citing to the decision reached in Woodbury.'"
Thus, it would make sense to analyze the underlying justifications out-
lined by the Court in Woodbury prior to extending or limiting the impact
of its rule. Analysis of the opinion reveals that the two main concerns of
the Woodbury Court were:
(1) Upholding the longstanding policy that government contracts
should be interpreted and applied in accordance with federal law, not
state law.' 58
(2) Ensuring that government contracts are uniformly interpreted and
applied.159
Although the facts of Woodbury involved a plaintiff that suffered
purely pecuniary harm, the Court did not use this fact as a basis for its
decision.' 6 0 As has been explained in greater detail above, Martin
exposes government contracts to the various laws of the fifty states,
which in turn subjects the contracting parties to uncertainty. Further-
more, the Martin decision is inconsistent because, on the one hand, it
states that all classic torts are in the District Court's jurisdiction, but on
the other hand, those torts resulting in pecuniary harm are under the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.161 Some classic torts inevitably
result in pecuniary harm. Also, the Martin Court ignored much of the
language in Woodbury. Importantly, it ignored the Woodbury Court's
analysis of Aleutco, a case which the Martin Court relied on while mak-
ing its decision.16 2 It also overlooked Feres, which was a very important
decision that advanced the idea that a relationship governed by federal
155. Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1965).
156. Woodbury, 313 F.2d 291; Blanchard, 341 F.2d 351.
157. Woodbury, 313 F.2d 291; Blanchard, 341 F.2d 351.
158. Woodbury, 313 F.2d at 295.
159. Id.
160. See generally id.
161. See generally Martin v. United States, 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
162. Woodbury, 313 F.2d at 296.
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law cannot be governed by state law under the FTCA.'63 Coupled with
the long-standing. policy discussed in this article, Feres alone would call
for tort claims based on the breach of a duty established in a government
contract to be litigated in the Court of Claims.
B. The Eleventh Circuit should be bound by the precedent
established in Blanchard, Smith, and Herder Truck
It has long been established that the Eleventh Circuit is bound to
follow the decisions reached by the former Fifth Circuit.164 Prior deci-
sions by other Circuits can be used to persuade the Eleventh Circuit;
however, these decisions do not carry the influence that former Fifth
Circuit decisions do. Accordingly, the principles and rationale enunci-
ated in Blanchard should shape the Eleventh Circuit's approach to
claims brought under the FTCA based on the breach of a duty estab-
lished in a government contract, not Martin.
While recognizing that Courts often overrule prior opinions and
follow the rationale of other Courts, Blanchard should not be overruled
because it upholds the longstanding policy discussed above and ensures
the uniform interpretation and application of government contracts."6 s If
the principles and rationale of Blanchard conflict with the principles and
rationale of Martin, Blanchard should be followed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Some actions brought against the United States under tort law
involve the interpretation of a government contract. At times, such inter-
pretation is necessary to establish that the United States owed a particu-
lar plaintiff a duty, which it allegedly breached through the course of
actions of its employees or agents. These actions present an issue that
has been addressed by relatively few courts. That is, where should such
actions be litigated? Should they be litigated in the District Courts under
the FTCA, or should they be litigated in the Court of Claims under the
Tucker Act? Ostensibly, this is a simple question. Torts should be
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. However, consideration of
long standing policies and governmental interests complicates the
question.
As has been analyzed and discussed in this article, there exists a
long standing policy that contracts entered into by the United States are
163. Id. at 295-96.
164. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1981).
165. See Woodbury, 313 F.2d at 295; see also Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
341 F.2d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 1965).
2012] 1179
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to be interpreted and applied using federal law.1 6 6 It has also been estab-
lished that actions brought in the District Courts under the FTCA are
governed exclusively by state law.'6' Thus, there is a tension between
the long standing policy and the governing law under the FTCA in cases
where a government contract must be interpreted to determine whether
or not the United States owed a duty to a particular plaintiff under par-
ticular circumstances.
The Ninth Circuit, through Woodbury, addressed this tension by
holding that tort actions in which a plaintiff alleges that the United
States breached a duty established in a government contract are subject
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act.168 The
Court expressly noted that it was concerned with the law that is used to
interpret and apply government contracts.169 The underlying concern
was that government contracts should be uniformly interpreted.'7 o
Nowhere in its analysis or reasoning did the Court ever mention that the
type of harm resulting from the alleged breach was relevant in determin-
ing whether the action was to be litigated in the Court of Claims or the
District Court."' Nonetheless, eighteen years later, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Woodbury only applied where a plaintiff complains of
pecuniary harm, not physical harm.' 7 2
The Eleventh Circuit, through Blanchard, has adopted the rule in
Woodbury. However, the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the subse-
quent limitation expressed in Martin. As mentioned above, it is unclear
how the Eleventh Circuit would approach the issue. This is because
those opinions that favorably quote Woodbury have all involved a plain-
tiff that complained of pecuniary harm. Thus, although the Court has not
explicitly adopted the limitation in Martin, it has also not explicitly
rejected it. Although a Middle District of Alabama opinion has expressly
adopted the limitation in Martin, the Eleventh Circuit should not follow
suit.
The limitation in Martin disregards the fundamental justifications
for the standard articulated in Woodbury. As this article has explained,
the opinion suffers from other shortfalls. But the most significant of
those is that the opinion opens the door to government contracts being
interpreted and applied using state, rather than federal law. The Eleventh
Circuit should take the opportunity presented by Downs, in the event
166. Woodbury, 313 F.2d 291.
167. Id. at 295.
168. Id. at 295-96.
169. Id.at 295.
170. Id.
171. See generally id.
172. See Martin v. United States, 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
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that the case is appealed, to clarify its position on this issue. It should
reaffirm the standards set out in Blanchard, adopt the language provided
in Wood, and ultimately hold that any tort in which a duty established in
a government contract is allegedly breached should be litigated in the
Court of Claims under the Tucker Act.17 3
173. See Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1965); see also
Wood v. United States, 961 F.2d 195, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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